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What Nvidia’s Board Got Wrong Before It Picked Colette Kress

What Nvidia's board did this week, and what your board should learn from it.


Why Jensen Huang left

On 12 November 2026, Nvidia announced that Jensen Huang had resigned as president, CEO and board member. He left the same day. He started the company in 1993 and ran it for 33 years. The press release thanked him. It did not say why he left.

 

Jensen Huang, ex-CEO of Nvidia
Jensen Huang, ex-CEO of Nvidia


The answer lies in the four weeks before.

The reason is an affair.

On 8 November, Huang admitted to an affair with Alice Huang, a senior executive at one of Nvidia’s customers. They share a surname but are not related.


According to the New York Times, US intelligence agencies believed she was passing information to Beijing.

That turned a private matter into a question of national security, and of whether the board was able to trust what its CEO told it.


Her company, Megaspeed, runs data centers out of Singapore and bought more than $4.8 billion of Nvidia chips in two years.


China called the spy claims groundless. Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs denied that it had investigated her for spying, but its police confirmed they were looking into Megaspeed.

Nobody knows where she is now.


Megaspeed office in Singapore
Megaspeed office in Singapore

So the CEO of the company that makes America's most strategic chips had an affair with an executive of a customer under criminal investigation for helping China get those chips. That is why the board had no way to treat it as a private matter.


Here is how it unfolded.

On 29 October, after the first press reports, Huang called his contacts with her “completely normal and not unusual.” 


Ten days later, on Sunday 8 November, he told staff he had been unfaithful to his wife, and told the board the woman was Alice Huang. The board opened an independent investigation that day. It said it saw no sign that national security or company secrets had been compromised, and that it had confidence in him.


On 10 November, the independent directors hired Joon H. Kim of Wachtell Lipton, a former acting US Attorney for the Southern District of New York.


On 11 November, they accepted his resignation.

Officially, he resigned. Nobody at Nvidia has said he was fired.


There is no public evidence that he leaked secrets or helped anyone dodge export rules.


As a board member, the affair is not what worries me. Two gaps do.


Huang gave two different accounts of the relationship, ten days apart. And the board went from backing him to accepting his exit in four days.


The Israeli business daily Calcalist argued that Nvidia's first denial hurt it more than the affair itself.

I agree.


What the market thinks

Investors did not wait for the investigation.



On 9 November, the day after the board announced its inquiry, they fell 4.27% to $178.67, on a day the Nasdaq rose 2.74%.


On 12 November, the shares opened more than 13% down and closed at $166.19, down 4.34%.


That close sits about 30.5% below the October record. $1.7 trillion in market value lost since October.


Not all of that is Huang's doing.



The cleanest measure of the scandal came on 9 November, when Nvidia lost 4.3% while the main chip index rose 6.85%.

That same Monday, shareholders filed a proposed class action. They accuse Huang and the company of hiding his ties to a suspected Chinese spy.


Who took over

Colette Kress has been Nvidia's chief financial officer since September 2013.


She is now interim CEO as well, and keeps the finance job until the board finds a permanent CEO. Harvey C. Jones became the board's first-ever chair.




Colette Kress, Interim CEO of Nvidia. Foto: via REUTERS
Colette Kress, Interim CEO of Nvidia. Foto: via REUTERS

She is the first woman to run Nvidia.


Her career is long: senior finance jobs at Cisco, 13 years at Microsoft (four of them as CFO of its Server and Tools division) and 8 years at Texas Instruments. Fortune ranked her No. 49 on its 2026 Most Powerful Women list. Headhunters were naming her as a safe choice before Huang quit.


Within a day, Fast Company, Forbes and WirtschaftsWoche had all reached for the same two words: glass cliff.


What the glass cliff means

Most people know the glass ceiling, the hidden barrier that keeps women out of top jobs.


The glass ceiling
The glass ceiling

The glass cliff describes what happens when that ceiling does open.


The glass cliff
The Glass Cliff

It tends to open when the company is already in trouble and the risk of failure is at its highest.


Michelle Ryan and Alexander Haslam of the University of Exeter named the effect in 2005, in the British Journal of Management.


In June 2016, The Leadership Quarterly published a special issue on gender and leadership, edited by Alice Eagly and Madeline Heilman. In it, Ryan, Haslam and four colleagues reviewed ten years of research.


Their conclusion:


The effect is real, it depends on context, and it has more than one cause.

Their first study tracked the share prices of FTSE 100 companies.


Before a man joined a board, share prices were fairly stable. In the five months before a woman joined, they were consistently poor. The trouble came first. The woman came second.


Lab experiments told the same story. When people were told a company was failing, they picked the female candidate. When it was doing well, they rated equally qualified men and women the same. Voters, students and lawyers all did this.


Two more findings matter for Nvidia. The preference for a woman appeared when the job was to survive a crisis, take the blame or manage people. It vanished when the job was to act as spokesperson or to turn results around. And people chose the woman only when the job came without support. Once support was on offer, they went back to choosing a man.


Other studies point the same way.

Christy Glass and Alison Cook found that white women and people of colour were more likely than white men to become CEO of a struggling firm.


A 2020 meta-analysis by Morgenroth, Kirby, Ryan and Sudkämper found the effect stronger in countries with less gender equality, though company records gave mixed results.


Jan-Philipp Ahrens and colleagues looked at more than 800 family firms in Germany. When a son and a daughter were both in line to take over, the son got the job 81.2% of the time. Daughters took over more often when nobody had planned the handover.


All three studies are cited in Forbes, 13 November 2026.


One finding from the 2016 review fits Nvidia closely.


The glass cliff showed up in share prices. It did not show up in accounting figures such as return on assets. Nvidia's accounts look strong, with second-quarter revenue of $96.2 billion, up 106%. Its share price looks weak.


Kress has inherited a crisis of confidence, which is the kind of crisis the research links to women's appointments.


You will know some of the names.


Marissa Mayer took over a shrinking Yahoo in 2012.


Marissa Mayer
Marissa Mayer

Mary Barra became CEO of General Motors in 2014, weeks before its faulty ignition switch recall went public.


Mary Barra
Mary Barra

Theresa May became UK prime minister in 2016 to deliver a Brexit she had voted against.


Teresa May
Teresa May

Jill Soltau took over a declining JCPenney in 2018, and


Linda Yaccarino
Linda Yaccarino

She is qualified, and the pattern is still there

Kress is qualified. That makes the pattern harder to see.


A glass cliff does not need a weak candidate. It needs a board that turns to a woman when the risk is high, and to someone else once the risk falls.


Forbes lists the precedents.


In 2010, HP made its CFO, Cathie Lesjak, interim CEO. Within two months it had hired an outsider.

At Nvidia, after the CFO left in 2011, controller Karen Burns served as interim CFO for more than two years.


The research also tracks what happens next.

Cook and Glass found that women and minority CEOs were more likely than white men to be replaced when short-term results dipped, and called it the savior effect.


A Strategy & study of 2,500 large listed companies over ten years, cited in the same review, found 38% of women executives dismissed, against 27% of men. The review's authors suggest looking at the other side of the cliff too: the glass cushion, men's easier access to the high-profile jobs that come with support.


 Even the praise for Kress repeats the trap.

A PR executive told Fast Company that women “don't suffer from the same lapses in judgment as men.”


In the 2016 special issue, finance professor Renée Adams warned that promoting women on the strength of flattering stereotypes helps neither them nor anyone else (Adams, 2016). A board that hires a woman because women clean up messes has turned a stereotype into a succession plan.


Then look at what the board got from this choice.


Fast Company calls Kress a familiar face on Wall Street who explains Nvidia's plans well to investors.


I run a board simulation where directors face a food-safety recall and a bank that wants a governance plan within 30 days. At the end, I ask them the question I would put to Nvidia's directors:


Did you choose the person who fixes the problem, or the person who calms the market?

The warning signs are already visible. Kress holds two jobs. The public debate about the permanent CEO started without her, when President Trump suggested Tim Cook. The board has not said what it is looking for. On 17 November she will present results she forecast as CFO, five days after the CEO who set the strategy walked out.


The kiss cam precedent

In July 2025, the kiss cam at a Coldplay concert at Gillette Stadium caught Andy Byron, CEO of the data company Astronomer, with his arms around Kristin Cabot, its head of HR. Both were married to other people. The board opened an investigation and put both on leave. Byron resigned three days later. Cabot resigned the next week. Co-founder Pete DeJoy became interim CEO, and the company said its leaders must set the standard for conduct and accountability, a standard that had not been met.


Astronomer was a start-up worth more than $1.3 billion. Nvidia is the world's most valuable chipmaker. Their boards still behaved alike. Byron left three days after the video, and Huang three days after his confession. Both boards named a stand-in and launched a search before any investigation had finished. Neither acted on the relationship alone. Each moved once the public story got ahead of the company's own account.


The women's stories differ.

At Astronomer, the woman in the video lost her job too, and critics singled out her HR role. At Nvidia, the woman at the centre of the story works outside the company, and the woman inside it gets the clean-up.


Recent similar case

Norfolk Southern fired CEO Alan Shaw in 2024 and McDonald's fired Steve Easterbrook in 2019, both over relationships with colleagues.


Astronomer gave its reason in public. Nvidia gave none.


In a man's scandal, a woman often ends up in one of two seats: the one who leaves with him, or the one who stays to clean up. Which seat does your succession plan give her?

The ESG Audit: what Nvidia reports, and what the evidence shows


E: Environmental. The climate story lost its storyteller


Nvidia's FY2026 Sustainability Report opens with a letter from the CEO who left this week.


In it, Huang described AI as a five-layer cake with energy at the bottom, and admitted the energy challenge is real.


The report claims 100% clean electricity for the sites Nvidia runs.


PwC checked the FY2026 figures:


  • 9,822 tonnes of CO2e for Scope 1 and

  • 308,891 tonnes for location-based Scope 2. Those are small numbers.

  • Scope 3, the emissions in Nvidia's supply chain and products, is where the story sits. It went from 3,638,432 tonnes in FY2024 to 6,912,577 in FY2025 and 10,700,940 in FY2026, which is 2.94 times as much in two years. Greenpeace East Asia says Scope 3 makes up more than 99% of Nvidia's footprint. It adds that the report shows no concrete help for suppliers to buy renewable power, such as power purchase agreements.


Nvidia's answer is efficiency, and the numbers partly back it up.


FY2026 revenue was $215.9 billion, up 65%, which puts FY2025 revenue at about $130.8 billion. Emissions per million dollars of revenue fell from about 52.8 tonnes to about 49.6 tonnes, a drop of about 6%.


Total emissions still rose 55% in one year. The ratio improved. The atmosphere received more carbon.


There is a larger number missing from that curve. Nvidia's chips burn electricity in customers' data centers for years after the sale. Under the GHG Protocol, those are “use of sold products” emissions, part of Scope 3. Nvidia's reported inventory leaves them out.


Two investors tried to change that. Green Century Capital Management filed a resolution for the June 2026 annual meeting, with Mercy Investment Services as co-filer (Nvidia proxy statement). The request was modest. Nvidia would publish a report, at reasonable cost and without proprietary information, on the emissions from the use of its sold products. The method was left to management.


 The case for it was strong.


Nvidia has set a target to cut the emissions intensity of its sold GPUs by 75% per PFLOP by FY2030, yet it publishes no absolute figure for those emissions. Green Century funds argued that investors have no way to check whether the plan works.


Other chipmakers already publish this figure or have committed to: AMD, Nvidia's closest rival in AI chips, Intel, and two makers of chips for cars and industry, Onsemi in the United States and NXP in the Netherlands.


Green Century funds also pointed to a business risk: Nvidia's biggest customers are under pressure to cut their own emissions, and they will favour suppliers who give them the data.


The board's reply had three parts:

  1. Nvidia already reports in detail: Scope 3 across eight categories, targets validated by the Science Based Targets initiative, and product carbon footprints reviewed by a third party.

  2. Scope 3 methods are still developing and hard to make reliable, above all in a fast-moving AI industry.

  3. The proposal would replace management's judgment with a prescriptive method. The board added that it already plans to report use-phase emissions, as discussed with the proponent.


The board's best point is real.

Use-phase emissions depend on how hard customers run the chips and on the power grid behind each data center. Nvidia controls neither. Any estimate rests on assumptions. The rest of its case is weaker. The resolution left the method to management's discretion, so calling it prescriptive is a stretch. The board judged the numbers too uncertain to publish, yet certain enough to set a 75% target on them. And the promised disclosure came with no date, which Green Century flagged.


On 24 June, 2,939,623,603 shares voted for and 13,789,742,126 against, with 127,323,657 abstentions, which count as votes against. Support came to about 17.4%. The interim CEO now inherits that unfinished promise. As CFO, she also controls the spending plan that drives the emissions curve.


What to look into


1) Find out who your sustainability story depends on: who signs the CEO letter, who defends the targets to investors, and what happens to both if that person leaves within a week. 2) Report total emissions next to emissions per euro of revenue, in the same table, and set board targets on the total. A ratio target lets growth hide emissions. When management says it plans a new disclosure, write down the date and the name of the person who owns it.

S: Social. One person carries the cost of the change

The board promises that operations, customer commitments and the product roadmap will continue without interruption. Someone has to make that true. More than 60 executives reported directly to Huang. All of those lines now run to a woman who already runs finance.


Authority on paper arrives faster than authority in the room.

In the 2016 special issue, Andrea Vial, Jaime Napier and Victoria Brescoll described how this works. Women in charge get less respect and admiration from their staff than men in the same jobs, so they are seen as less legitimate.


Staff cooperate less. The leader reacts, her reaction seems to confirm the doubts, and her standing falls further.


The authors call it a self-reinforcing cycle of illegitimacy.


They also describe the way out: anything that raises the leader's status, or narrows the power gap her staff perceive, makes her more legitimate.


Kress also has less room to show emotion.


Brescoll showed that women leaders face two tests men do not face: how much emotion to show, and which kind.


A woman leader is penalised for even small signs of anger or pride, and penalised again if she seems cold.


On 17 November, analysts will question Kress about her former boss and her two jobs. They will judge her tone as closely as her answers. None of that work appears in a job description or a performance review.


The data say she will carry more of this load than a man would.


In LeanIn.Org and McKinsey’s Women in the Workplace 2024 report, 38% of women said they faced comments or behaviour that questioned their competence or undermined their leadership, against 26% of men. The German family-firm study adds that women get the unplanned successions, the ones with no handover.


Staff pay a price too. Employees learned of their founder's affair from a company email, and four days later learned he was gone. Huang's children work at the company. Managers across Nvidia now spend time answering worried teams. No sustainability report counts that time.


If Nvidia's quarterly earnings on 17 November beat expectations, who gets the credit? If they miss, whose name goes in the headline?

What to look into

Put the interim's authority in writing: budget, hiring, strategy and the length of the mandate. Record on day one the conditions she inherits, so she is judged against them. Give her the support the research says glass cliff jobs lack: a named board sponsor, public backing from the chair, and the right to pick her own team. Publish the search criteria and say whether the interim is a candidate. Silence tells the market she is keeping the seat warm.

G: Governance. Four days of full confidence

The timeline tells the story.

On 29 October, the CEO called the relationship normal.


On 8 November, he admitted the affair, and the board said it had confidence in him. On 10 November, it hired outside lawyers.


On 11 November, it accepted his resignation.


On 12 November, the new chair said the board had “full confidence” in Kress.


The board used the same word for him on Sunday and for her on Thursday.


Kress inherits a structure built long before she arrived.

Until this week, the board had no chair, only a lead independent director.


The new chair has sat on the board since 1993, so the director now in charge of reviewing the founder's era lived through all of it.


More than 60 people reported directly to Huang, and there was no obvious successor.


The interim CEO is also the CFO.


Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the CEO and the CFO each sign a certificate on the company's financial reports.

At Nvidia, one person now signs both.


Look at Nvidia through European rules and the gaps get clearer.

The Belgian Corporate Governance Code 2020 asks listed companies with a single board to give the chair and CEO jobs to two different people.


Nvidia met that standard this week, after 33 years.


The same Code sets nine tests for director independence. One of them limits a non-executive director to twelve years.


Harvey Jones has served 33.


Under the Belgian Code, the man now leading independent oversight would not count as independent.


Those nine tests have a blind spot of their own. They check time, money, shares, business ties, audit links and family. They never ask about friendship, school, industry, nationality or gender. A director who has dined with the CEO every month for 20 years passes all nine.


Theranos shows what that costs.


Elizabeth Holmes, CEO of Theranos
Elizabeth Holmes, CEO of Theranos

In October 2015, its board included three former cabinet secretaries, two former senators and two retired military officers. It had one woman and one licensed medical expert.


Ten of the twelve directors counted as independent.


None had the training to judge a blood test.


When doubts about the product grew, the board shrank from twelve members to five.


It moved its scientists to an advisory group with no vote and kept the company's outside lawyer.


Under pressure, boards reach for people they already trust.


Nvidia's board reached for a director from 1993 and a CFO from 2013.


The outside pressure is growing.

Three House committee chairs have asked Huang to a closed-door briefing on 18 November. The class action has been filed. The board's own investigation has no published scope and no deadline.


What would this board have done if the CFO had said no?

What to look into

Split the chair and CEO jobs before a crisis forces you to. A chair named in the week of a scandal inherits the scandal. Require disclosure of personal relationships with customers, suppliers and government contacts above a set threshold, and have the audit committee review them. Check every public statement about the CEO against what the board knows that day. The second statement always costs more than the first. Keep a written emergency succession plan with one named stand-in for the CEO and a different one for the CFO, so nobody signs both certificates. Set a target for the share of women on every CEO shortlist, and report on it. Victor Sojo and colleagues found that targets and quotas raised women's share of board seats more than disclosure rules alone (Sojo et al., 2016). The 2016 glass cliff review adds that the diversity of the people doing the hiring predicted women's promotion to CEO better than company performance did.

What boards miss, and what it costs

I ask board members that question before they introduce themselves.

On 22 October, I hosted nine of them for breakfast at TheMerode in Brussels, in a session called “Why does your board look like your CEO?” We ran real boards through the nine Belgian independence tests. The tests caught the executives and a lawyer with a conflict of interest. They missed what sank each company.


Theranos sold lab science to a board of diplomats and generals, and nobody asked who at the table knew how to read a blood test.


At Boeing, a Delaware court let shareholders sue the directors in 2021. It found credible the claims that no board committee was directly in charge of airplane safety, and that the board treated the first 737 MAX crash as a public relations problem. Two crashes killed 346 people.


Volkswagen gave board seats to workers, the state and two founding families, which made its board one of the most mixed in Europe by interest. By passport, 17 of its 20 supervisory board members were German or Austrian. The diesel cheating happened in the United States.


Each of these boards carried a risk in a field, a country or a group of people where nobody at the table had worked. Nvidia's blind spot had a name and an address in Singapore.


The research on diversity is less flattering than its fans claim, and more useful.


A review of 140 studies by Corinne Post and Kris Byron found that women on boards go with better accounting returns and closer board monitoring, with almost no link to share prices.


Green and Hand re-ran McKinsey's diversity tests on S&P 500 companies and found no significant link to margins, growth or returns.


In trading experiments, Sheen Levine and colleagues found that prices matched true values 58% better in ethnically diverse markets. In uniform markets, traders copied each other's mistakes. Nobody has proven that diversity lifts the average share price. The evidence shows that it makes people check each other harder. Checking is the board's job.


Conclusion

I have sat on 15 boards and chaired two. No board ever votes for a glass cliff. It votes for continuity and a safe pair of hands. The cliff hides in what the minutes leave out: the authority the stand-in never receives, and the criteria nobody writes down.


Before any crisis appointment, I ask a board four questions:


1) What authority does the interim hold, in writing, and for how long? 2) Which of the predecessor's decisions will she be judged on? 3) What are the published criteria for the permanent role, and is she on the shortlist? 4) Who issues the final verdict, and what evidence will they see?

I also ask directors to score their own board.


They compare the CEO with the chair and three directors on gender, nationality, first degree, career sector and decade of birth, one point per match, out of 20.


A high score tells you which risks nobody at your table will raise.

Belgian listed companies have had to give a third of their board seats to women since 2011. The EU deadline for 40% women among non-executive directors passed on 30 June 2026.


A European board that copies Nvidia's succession habits gets a compliance problem along with its glass cliff.


My P³ method, peer-reviewed in the International Journal of Business Administration, measures People, Planet and Profit in euros.


A glass cliff starts on the People line and ends on the Profit line, as a second search and a second drop in the share price.


Nvidia's shareholders have already paid for the first drop. A board that answers the four questions before it appoints anyone pays for the crisis once.


Nvidia reports third-quarter results on 17 November at 1:20 p.m. Pacific time.


I will read one line of that release first: the name under Chief Financial Officer.


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